Update on Overleaf.

This commit is contained in:
nb72soza Bittner
2025-07-03 02:10:04 +00:00
committed by node
parent 7902d61dfc
commit 37a1f7f6ac
15 changed files with 739 additions and 38 deletions

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@@ -126,7 +126,45 @@ Among all evaluated \glspl{esim}, \texttt{estk.me} stands out due to its publicl
The firmware image accompanying the update utility appears to be encrypted or obfuscated. An entropy analysis conducted using the Shannon entropy metric indicates a consistently high entropy across all tested firmware files, suggesting the presence of encryption or compression. For instance, the entropy of the T001V06 firmware image was measured at approximately \texttt{7.998}, which is close to the theoretical maximum of \texttt{8.0} for purely random data.
\todo{Entropy graph, shannon entropy for all firmwares}
\begin{figure}[htbp]
\centering
\begin{tikzpicture}
\begin{axis}[
title={Shannon Entropy},
xlabel={Block},
ylabel={Entropy},
legend pos=south west,
width=12cm,
height=6cm,
enlargelimits=true,
mark size=2pt,
xmin=0,
ymin=0,
grid,
]
\addplot[
color=blue,
mark=*,
] table [x expr=\coordindex, y index=0] {Graphics/data/shannon_entropy_estk_me_t000v06_3_4_3.dat};
\addlegendentry{T000V06}
\addplot[
color=red,
mark=square*,
] table [x expr=\coordindex, y index=0] {Graphics/data/shannon_entropy_estk_me_t001v06_3_4_3.dat};
\addlegendentry{T001V06}
\addplot[
color=green!60!black,
mark=triangle*,
] table [x expr=\coordindex, y index=0] {Graphics/data/shannon_entropy_estk_me_t002v06_3_4_3.dat};
\addlegendentry{T002V06}
\end{axis}
\end{tikzpicture}
\caption{Shannon entropy values across blocks for three different firmware versions.}
\end{figure}
A deeper static analysis using Ghidra did not reveal any recognizable structure or file headers, further supporting the assumption of encryption. Similarly, tools like Binwalk\footnote{https://github.com/ReFirmLabs/binwalk} did not detect known compression schemes, embedded file systems, or file signatures. Consequently, firmware payload analysis could not be meaningfully performed beyond block-level transmission.
@@ -220,7 +258,7 @@ We catalogued the \gls{isdr} \glspl{aid} observed during tracing across multiple
\item \textbf{standard}: \texttt{a0000005591010ffffffff8900000100}
\end{itemize}
This variation in \gls{aid} usage may be driven by internal vendor policy, branding, or the need to segment access to multiple security domains or services. In the case of \texttt{eSIM.me}, the coexistence of both the standard and custom \glspl{aid} suggests a fallback mechanism for compatibility with generic \gls{lpa} implementations. \todo{Check which applications are allowed by the ara-m}
This variation in \gls{aid} usage may be driven by internal vendor policy, branding, or the need to segment access to multiple security domains or services. In the case of \texttt{eSIM.me}, the coexistence of both the standard and custom \glspl{aid} suggests a fallback mechanism for compatibility with generic \gls{lpa} implementations.
While tracing provides valuable insights into command sequencing and \gls{aid} selection behaviors, its utility is restricted when it comes to exercising full profile management flows or cross-device compatibility testing without access to valid cryptographic credentials.