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Update on Overleaf.
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@@ -126,7 +126,45 @@ Among all evaluated \glspl{esim}, \texttt{estk.me} stands out due to its publicl
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The firmware image accompanying the update utility appears to be encrypted or obfuscated. An entropy analysis conducted using the Shannon entropy metric indicates a consistently high entropy across all tested firmware files, suggesting the presence of encryption or compression. For instance, the entropy of the T001V06 firmware image was measured at approximately \texttt{7.998}, which is close to the theoretical maximum of \texttt{8.0} for purely random data.
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\todo{Entropy graph, shannon entropy for all firmwares}
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\begin{figure}[htbp]
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\centering
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\begin{tikzpicture}
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\begin{axis}[
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title={Shannon Entropy},
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xlabel={Block},
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ylabel={Entropy},
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legend pos=south west,
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width=12cm,
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height=6cm,
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enlargelimits=true,
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mark size=2pt,
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xmin=0,
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ymin=0,
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grid,
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]
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\addplot[
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color=blue,
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mark=*,
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] table [x expr=\coordindex, y index=0] {Graphics/data/shannon_entropy_estk_me_t000v06_3_4_3.dat};
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\addlegendentry{T000V06}
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\addplot[
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color=red,
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mark=square*,
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] table [x expr=\coordindex, y index=0] {Graphics/data/shannon_entropy_estk_me_t001v06_3_4_3.dat};
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\addlegendentry{T001V06}
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\addplot[
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color=green!60!black,
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mark=triangle*,
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] table [x expr=\coordindex, y index=0] {Graphics/data/shannon_entropy_estk_me_t002v06_3_4_3.dat};
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\addlegendentry{T002V06}
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\end{axis}
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\end{tikzpicture}
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\caption{Shannon entropy values across blocks for three different firmware versions.}
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\end{figure}
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A deeper static analysis using Ghidra did not reveal any recognizable structure or file headers, further supporting the assumption of encryption. Similarly, tools like Binwalk\footnote{https://github.com/ReFirmLabs/binwalk} did not detect known compression schemes, embedded file systems, or file signatures. Consequently, firmware payload analysis could not be meaningfully performed beyond block-level transmission.
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@@ -220,7 +258,7 @@ We catalogued the \gls{isdr} \glspl{aid} observed during tracing across multiple
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\item \textbf{standard}: \texttt{a0000005591010ffffffff8900000100}
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\end{itemize}
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This variation in \gls{aid} usage may be driven by internal vendor policy, branding, or the need to segment access to multiple security domains or services. In the case of \texttt{eSIM.me}, the coexistence of both the standard and custom \glspl{aid} suggests a fallback mechanism for compatibility with generic \gls{lpa} implementations. \todo{Check which applications are allowed by the ara-m}
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This variation in \gls{aid} usage may be driven by internal vendor policy, branding, or the need to segment access to multiple security domains or services. In the case of \texttt{eSIM.me}, the coexistence of both the standard and custom \glspl{aid} suggests a fallback mechanism for compatibility with generic \gls{lpa} implementations.
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While tracing provides valuable insights into command sequencing and \gls{aid} selection behaviors, its utility is restricted when it comes to exercising full profile management flows or cross-device compatibility testing without access to valid cryptographic credentials.
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