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Update on Overleaf.
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@@ -35,15 +35,15 @@ To conduct a thorough and representative evaluation, we selected a diverse set o
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Xesim & Eastcompeace & 4.2.0 & 2.2.2 & 0 \\
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\hline
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\end{tabular}
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\caption{Overview of Analyzed eSIM Cards}
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\caption{Overview of Analyzed eSIM Cards based on the information from \texttt{EuiccInfo2}.}
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\label{tab:esim-overview}
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\end{table}
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Among the tested cards, the \textbf{sysmoEUICC} is loaded with a GSMA test certificate, allowing it to interact with the official \gls{smdpp} test server infrastructure. This certificate is publicly available and enables the evaluation of remote profile management procedures in a realistic but controlled environment. The firmware implementation of the sysmoEUICC is assumed to be functionally equivalent to production-grade \glspl{esim}. However, this restricts use to use Profiles which are also signed by the GSMA test certificate.
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Among the tested cards, the \textbf{sysmoEUICC} is loaded with a \gls{gsma} test certificate, allowing it to interact with the official \gls{smdpp} test server infrastructure. This certificate is publicly available and enables the evaluation of remote profile management procedures in a realistic but controlled environment. The firmware implementation of the sysmoEUICC is assumed to be functionally equivalent to production-grade \glspl{esim}. However, this restricts use to use Profiles which are also signed by the \gls{gsma} test certificate.
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In contrast, \textbf{estk.me} does not expose an \gls{isdr} for \gls{lpa}-based interaction, limiting the scope of evaluation for that platform. As such, only \gls{usat}-based interaction was possible, and no \gls{rsp}-related operations via the implemented testing framework could be performed.
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The \textbf{9esim V2} card, in comparison, fully supports both \gls{isdr} access and \gls{usat} communication. Although \gls{usat} interfaces were excluded from evaluation for this particular card due to it not being supported by the testing framwork.
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The \textbf{9esim v2} card, in comparison, fully supports both \gls{isdr} access and \gls{usat} communication. Although \gls{usat} interfaces were excluded from evaluation for this particular card due to it not being supported by the testing framwork.
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% general findings
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@@ -587,9 +587,7 @@ The following classes of errors were consistently encountered during mutation ca
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\subsection{Analysis of Successful Mutations}
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\label{subsec:successful_mutations}
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To further understand the behavior of different \glspl{euicc} under mutation-based fuzzing, we post-processed all recorded \gls{apdu} traces stored in the \texttt{recordings/*.resim} directory.
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\todo{Be more clear about how many and which recordings were performed}
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To further understand the behavior of different \glspl{euicc} under mutation-based fuzzing, we post-processed all recorded \gls{apdu} traces.
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\subsubsection*{Mutation Examples}
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@@ -637,7 +635,7 @@ By combining a series of failed and mutated authentication requests, it was poss
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A deeper analysis of mutated \gls{apdu} payloads of the initial \texttt{AuthenticateServerRequest}, particularly in cases using different \gls{smdpp} servers, shows the following:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item The first mutation typically occurs in the tag of the \texttt{AuthenticateServerRequest}, where the correct \texttt{bf38} tag is flipped to an invalid \texttt{be38}. Correcting this tag lets us decode the remaining data.
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\item The first mutation typically occurs in the tag of the \texttt{AuthenticateServerRequest}, where the correct \texttt{BF38} tag is flipped to an invalid \texttt{BE38}. Correcting this tag lets us decode the remaining data.
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\item In cross-server scenarios (different \gls{smdpp}), subsequent flips occur in fields such as \texttt{euiccPkiToBeUsed}, \texttt{serverCertificate.serialNumber}, \texttt{serverSignature1}, and both the \texttt{euiccChallenge} and \texttt{serverChallenge} components of \texttt{serverSigned1}. This attempt will not be able to pass the bug.
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@@ -663,8 +661,8 @@ However, these attempts consistently resulted in an \texttt{UndefinedError} exce
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This reinforces the assumption that the \gls{euicc} maintains non-trivial persistent state across sessions, and that this state influences the acceptance of subsequent messages even when they originate from clean profiles or well-formed certificates.
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\todo{Find out which parts are reused aswell -> serverSigned1, serverSignature}
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\todo{serverSigned1 -> check if signature is verified}
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% \todo{Find out which parts are reused aswell -> serverSigned1, serverSignature}
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% \todo{serverSigned1 -> check if signature is verified}
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\subsubsection*{Implications}
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The observed behavior violates \gls{gsma} security requirements, particularly in Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 of SGP.22~\cite{gsma_sgp22_2025}, which mandate certificate chain validation and signature verification during server authentication. The following points summarize the core issues:
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