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47 lines
3.0 KiB
TeX
47 lines
3.0 KiB
TeX
% !TeX root = ../Thesis.tex
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%************************************************
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\chapter{Introduction}\label{ch:introduction}
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%************************************************
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\glsresetall % Resets all acronyms to not used
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% todays society is connected
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% all devices i.e Smartphones, iot devices, vehicles are connected and often have an SIM -> connect to cellular networks
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% The first phones supporting esims released in 2016 with the iphone that supports esim being released in 2018
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% in recent years: esims became more and more popular in such applications
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% advantages: no need to switch out hardware when getting a new phone contract, easier to switch out the profile when going to a foreign country an getting a temporary phone contract (or something similar)
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% adoption of eSIM technology is increasing rapidly due to its flexibility, remote provisioning capability, and suitability for IoT and mobile devices
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% most newly released phone support esims -> new attack vector for adversaries
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% people with older hardware i.e no esim support by their phone are left out -> introduction of eSIM on SIM
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% esim.me marketed their esim on sim as "world’s first eSIM Card" with their launch in 2020
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% esim on sim enable old phones to use eSIM via sim slot or other applications
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\section{Motivation}
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% esim standard is developed by the GSMA, ETSI and 3GPP -> security was build into the design from the ground up
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% other researches have already looked at the specs in depth (cite papers here)
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% implementation of the esim firmware is still up to the manufacturs which develope their own versions -> possibility of vulnerabilities in their implementations
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% lack of formal security evaluation
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% security vulnerabilities can have a major impact -> persistence of exploits are high: malicouse profiles may persist accross reboots or even device resets; often low level and invisible -> particularly dangerous and hard to detect
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% sims have direct, priviledged, unfiltered access to the baseband
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% non standard implementations may introduce bugs or security flaws
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% esim specs may have been interpretated differently by the different vendors
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% differential testing offers automated and scalable method to detect inconsistency in the different implementations -> comparing output of multiple esim on sim implementations against the same inputs
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\section{Contribution}
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% implement framework for differential testing of esims (esims and esim on sim)
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% containing: fuzzing of structural input when communicating with the esim, fuzzing on transport level, tracing and replaying recordings from one esim to another; make it accessible via cli and as a library for scripting
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% using the tracing functionality we discover first implementation differences in the implementation
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% reverse engineer the update functionality of the estk.me esim
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% demonstrate the framworks ability in security research:
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% discover and evaluate bug in the profile provisioning process of one manufacturer -> evaluate the impact
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\section{Outline}
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